Analogs, theories, and decision making by Olsson, Gunnar
ANALOGS,  THEORIES, AND DECISION M A K I N G  
Comments on Wal ter  Isard's Paper 
GUNNAR OLSSON 
Universlty of Michigan 
Thinking of Walter Isard, I always remember the lectures he gave a few years 
ago when I was a visiting student at the University of Pennsylvania. What im- 
pressed me most then--and certainly what I appreciate most now--was not neces- 
sarily what he said, but rather why and how he said it. In particular, I remember 
how fluid his lectures were and how they always illustrated the constant reevaluation 
to which he subjected his own research. 
This constant reevaluation approach characterizes also his most recent writings 
on the interrelations between the concepts of time and distance. Thus, in comparing 
the Santa Monica paper from November, 1969 [5], with the London paper from 
August, 1970 [6], some major changes can be detected. The same holds, although 
naturally to a smaller extent, if one compares the current November, 1970 [7], 
version with that prepared three months earlier for the London meeting. Because 
of this open-mindedness on Walter Isard's part, it is almost certain that practically 
anything a discussant can say the author already has either rejected or saved for a 
future conference. Nevertheless, it may be useful to summarize and perhaps 
rephrase what I take to be the goal of the Isardian trilogy. Once this has been done, 
it may be easier to understand why even an experienced explorer sometimes can be 
tempted to chart his course through risky and wreckage-torn methodological 
waters. 
To put Walter Isard's dilemma in perspective, one must recall that the current 
series of papers is concerned with the important problem of how social scientists 
(',an develop theoretical constructs that are both intellectually pleasing to the aca- 
demic community and practically useful to decision-makers and policy-formulators. 
Given the traditions of regional science, it is not surprising that he wishes the imag- 
ined theory to treat time and space concomitantly. For this reason, he focused 
the first part of the" trilogy on a reexamination of the interrelations of time and 
distance. The hope was that such a reexamination would lead to a dynamic spatial 
theory capable of assigning probability values to projected future events. Initially, 
this theory was conceived in terms of a standardized metric equally valid at all 
times and at all places. Even though Isard's increased awareness of cultural dif- 
t~rences subsequently forced him to abandon this hope for universality, this must, 
of course, not keep us from acknowledging the boldness and urgency of his at- 
tempt. 
The following comments stem from my conference discussion of Walter Isard's paper [7]. 
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But it is not enough to have good intentions and applaudable reasons. Instead, 
the researcher must prove the strength and validity of his arguments by carefully 
detailing his procedures of reasoning. Perhaps the most important requirement 
in this regard is that the employed procedures of reasoning are so consistent that 
the final answer is certain to be the answer to the original question. As I interpret 
the Isardian papers, this original question concerns the formulation of a general 
dynamic spatial theory in terms that are acceptable both to ivory tower academicians 
and to policy-formulating decision-makers. More precisely, it was stated in the 
Santa Monica paper [5] that if the proposed concepts "were found acceptable by 
the academic and decision making community, the associated magnitudes. . .  
could be held in common by all scholars, decision makers, and policy formulators." 
If this interpretation of Isard's goal is correct, then I must admit that the selected 
procedure of reasoning bothers me. More precisely, I am bothered because of 
the heavy reliance on notions borrowed from the general relativity and field theories. 
Although reasoning by analogy can be very illuminating in the early intuitive and 
inductive phases of theory formulation, I had hoped the author now could have 
proceeded into distinctions between the negative and the positive parts of the analogy. 
Such distinctions would have been particularly timely, as he has tended to extend 
the formal similarities into substantive analogies. 
But it is not the failure to provide distinctions between the positive and the 
negative parts of the analogy that concerns me most. Rather, I am uncertain 
whether reasoning by analogy is likely to furnish meaningful answers to the initial 
question--how to design a theory with straightforward implications for planning 
and decision making. This is a crucial reservation based on my view that the 
relations between decision making and theory formulation are best established by 
specification of target variables and causation flows. Thus, I think Isard's problem 
can be reformulated so it becomes a matter Of determining how one set of variables 
can be influenced through the intentional manipulation of another set of variables. 
The solution of the problem thus defined requires the theory to be provided with 
clear correspondence rules. Since it is doubtful whether Isard in fact has isolated 
those variables and causal flows, it may be argued that he has not answered his 
initial and applaudable question. To substantiate this rather blunt remark about 
the role of correspondence rules in planning theory, it is necessary to draw atten- 
tion to some classical issues in the philosophy of science. 
It is well known that positivists like Carnap [2] tend to equate correspondence 
rules with operational definitions or, in another terminology, with the "operational 
conveyance of meaning." In short, strict positivists use correspondence rules as 
a means for linking the terms in the theory with those observables via which their 
theory is made falsifiable or confirmable. In accordance with his instrumentalist 
view of what a theory is, Hempel [4] is somewhat more permissb/e, suggesting that 
correspondence rules be defined as interpretative statements that characteristically 
contain a combination of theoretical and observational terms. Others speak of 
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the "dictionary of a theory" through which the experimental hypotheses of the 
theoretical language are tied to their observational implications. Logicians, 
finally, prefer to think of correspondence rules as semantical rules which specify 
what is denoted by a syntactical term. 
The mentioned definitions of correspondence rules are all rather closely con- 
nected with the dichotomous view of theoretical and observational languages that 
characterizes the works of the positivists. As recalled, the proponents of this view 
frequently argue that perhaps the most important phase in scientific discourse is 
the bridging of the gap that separates these two languages. Traditionally, this has 
been done by providing the theory with a model, which then in turn has been con- 
nected with observables. In case discrepancies between the language of the theory 
and the language of the empirical observations were revealed, then the positivists 
argued a priori that it was the theory that was wrong and needed to be reformulated. 
Drawing on the recent debate in philosophy, I think few people nowadays 
would argue for the extreme dichotomy approach of the traditional positivists. At 
least partly this is so because a strong empiricist emphasis seems irreconcilable with 
the idea that social science theories be used as guidelines for action and change; 
to argue otherwise would be a contradiction in terms, implying that we are so satisfied 
with the current state of society that we would do our best not to change it. As a 
consequence, I think planners and social scientists will become increasingly con- 
cerned with fitting reality and observational statements to a priori preference prem- 
ises and Iess engaged in formulating theories which attempt to mirror empirical 
occurrences as they are presently observed. This is a rather radical view of ob- 
jective science, because it suggests that the social scientist c u r e  social engineer ought 
to be concerned not only with altering his theories so they conform with current 
empirical observations but also with rebuilding the empirical basis of his observa- 
tions so that it conforms with the moral and ideological premises of his theories. 
It follows that the appeal of a particular theory would not be independent of our 
anticipation of the effects the theoretical predictions would have if actually im- 
plemented through practical planning. 
In accordance with the metatheoretic preferences just outlined, I think it 
necessary to define the concept of a correspondence rule somewhat more broadly 
than the positivists would have us do [8, 10]. In particular, I prefer to think of 
correspondence rules as providing linkages in collapsed causal sequences, where 
these sequences typically belong to different levels in the hierarchy of statements. 
On the highest level of abstraction, this would require the use of correspondence 
rules for establishing the connection between moral preferences on the one hand 
and the choice of a particular logical language on the other. On the next level, 
the chosen logic would be allowed to influence the intermediary translations into 
theories and models. In turn, these correspondence rules can influence the low- 
level reasoning that occurs when theoretical model predictions and empirical 
observations are confronted with one another. Finally, there is a need for well- 
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specified translation functions for comparing imaginary model predictions with 
the pragmatic utilities and moral consequences that would arise if a plan based on 
an imaginary model were to be implemented in the real world. 
Returning now to Walter Isard's series of papers, I think it is fair to say that 
he has not provided much detail on his correspondence rules. Moreover, I think 
this ambiguity prevails regardless of the level in the hierarchy of statements that 
we decide to examine. More exactly, I suspect a politician would feel quite lost 
if he tried to figure out the social costs and benefits that would be attached to the 
implementation of this rudimentary theory. In addition, I think the planner would 
feel equally lost if he tried to isolate target variables and flows of causation that 
would allow him to manipulate society in a reasonably safe way. I tend to share 
this confusion and I believe it stems primarily from the heavy use of reasoning by 
analogy. One may hope, therefore, that when the present trilogy eventually grows 
into a quarter the emphasis will be on the specification of broadly defined cor- 
respondence rules and on the separation of positive and negative parts of the analogy. 
Once this has been done, I am confident Walter Isard will proceed to the re- 
evaluation of the entire quartet. Having performed that reevaluation, I would not 
be surprised if he still were dissatisfied. In particular, he is likely to be dissatisfied 
because I suspect he would find that some sentences in his theoretical language 
are semantically indeterminate. If this is the case, then he may eventually wish to 
search for new approaches in the literature on the logic of empirical theories as this 
logic has been developed during the 1960's by Polish logicians like S.uszko and 
Pret~cki [9]. I am suggesting this approach beacuse the model-theoretic or seman- 
tical treatment of logic has provided a nataral setting for discussions of empirical 
meaningfulness, that is, of the problem that lies at the root of all the above com- 
ments. Another attractive feature of these logical structures is that the law of the 
excluded middle fails and that they consequently do not assign any truth status to 
indeterminate sentences. 
At this point, I should perhaps follow Walter Isard's good example and un- 
dertake a reevaluation of my own evaluation. For instance, there are several 
technical points in the three papers that I have not even mentioned, much less dis- 
cussed. Despite this neglect, I hope not to be criticized for committing my omis- 
sion. Thus, to speak with Bentham [1, Chap. 8; 3], I feel I have not "failed to 
warn the King of the impending danger and done so in order to bring it about that 
the King would be killed." Instead, I have tried to point out some of the hidden 
methodological rocks he may run into if he insists on pursuing his current course. 
However, the intuitive feeling that these and many other unrecognized dangers 
still may imperil the voyage must not keep us from acknowledging what an achieve- 
ment it would be if the voyager could stay clear and safely reach his goal on the 
other shore. 
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